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Abstract
Dramatic increases and decreases in housing prices have had an enormous impact
on the economies of various countries. If this kind of °uctuation in housing prices is
linked to °uctuations in the consumer price index (CPI) and GDP, it may be re°ected
in ¯scal and monetary policies. However, during the 1980s housing bubble in Japan
and the later U.S. housing bubble, °uctuations in asset prices were not su±ciently
re°ected in price statistics and the like. The estimation of imputed rent for owner-
occupied housing is said to be one of the most important factors for this. Using multiple
previously proposed methods, this study estimated the imputed rent for owner-occupied
housing in Tokyo and clari¯ed the extent to which the estimated imputed rent diverged
depending on the estimation method. Examining the results obtained showed that,
during the bubble's peak, there was an 11-fold discrepancy between the Equivalent
Rent Approach currently employed in Japan and Equivalent Rent calculated with a
hedonic approach using market rent. Meanwhile, with the User Cost Approach, during
the bubble period when asset prices rose signi¯cantly, the values became negative with
some estimation methods. Accordingly, we estimated Diewert's OOH Index, which was
proposed by Diewert and Nakamura (2009). When the Diewert's OOH Index results
estimated here were compared to Equivalent Rent Approach estimation results modi¯ed
with the hedonic approach using market rent, it revealed that from 1990 to 2009, the
Diewert's OOH Index results were on average 1.7 times greater than the Equivalent
Rent Approach results, with a maximum 3-fold di®erence. These ¯ndings suggest that
even when the Equivalent Rent Approach is improved, signi¯cant discrepancies remain.
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1 Introduction
Housing price °uctuations exert e®ects on the economy through various channels. More
precisely, however, relative prices between housing and other assets prices and goods/services
prices are the variable that should be observed.
Even if both assets and goods/services prices (and wages) double, the assets price hike
alone may have little impact on the economy. In reality, however, housing prices posted sub-
stantial hikes and declines both in Japan and the United States while goods/services prices
represented by consumer price indexes moved little (Diewert and Nakamura (2009),(2011)),
Shimizu and Watanabe (2010)). Why? Given the substantial hikes and declines in housing
prices, Shimizu, Nishimura and Watanabe (2010) look into why the substantial housing price
°uctuations did not spill over to goods/services prices.
Housing rents are the most important variable for an analysis of housing price °uctuations'
spillover e®ects on goods/services prices. Housing services account for more than a quarter
of consumers' typical consumption in Japan and the United States. Therefore, if housing
price hikes spill over to housing rents, consumer prices may soar. Goodhart (2001) said
housing rents are a joint between assets and goods/services prices.
In order to understand why housing price °uctuations fail to spill over to consumer prices,
we may have to check how housing price °uctuations spill over to housing rents. Let us look
into characteristic di®erences between new and renewal rents.
Summarizing the Shimizu, Nishimura and Watanabe (2010)'s ¯ndings, we can conclude
that while there is some mechanism for new rents to come closer to market prices, long-term
relationships between house owners and tenants, as well as legal regulations, have made it
di±cult for renewal rents to come closer to market levels. This is one of the reasons for the
absence of any close link between the CPI rent and housing prices.
The absence is also attributable to a method for measuring the CPI rent. The CPI rent
includes a conventional rent and an imputed rent representing the price of housing services
that a house owner receives. In Tokyo, for example, the conventional rent portion accounts
for about 20% of the total rent and the imputed rent for about 80%. The imputed rent thus
captures the greater part of the total rent. Conceptually, the imputed rent is a rent level
that a house owner can receive when leasing the house in the rental house market today.
Therefore, the imputed rent always matches the market price.
For example, Diewert and Nakamura (2009),(2011) de¯ned the imputed rent as the services
yielded by the use of a dwelling by the corresponding market value for the same sort of
dwelling for the same period of time. When measuring the CPI rent, however, the Ministry
of Internal A®airs and Communications collects data of real rents applied to apartment and
other houses since market prices are practically di±cult to survey. As noted above, such rent
data include renewal rents that deviate from market prices and have little link to housing
prices. Therefore, the CPI rent that substitutes renewal rents for the imputed rent has little
link to housing prices.
How serious is the problem in practice? Shimizu, Nishimura and Watanabe (2010) esti-
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mated the imputed rent using market rents measured through turnover of contracted rents.
Speci¯cally, the study replaced the imputed rent out of all CPI components with the new
imputed market rent index, left the other CPI components untouched and computed a New
CPI. Estimation results indicate that the New CPI in°ation rate exceeded the Real CPI
in°ation by more than 1 percentage point during the bubble period in the second half of
the 1980s. When the bubbles burst in the ¯rst half of the 1990s, the New CPI in°ation was
some 2 percentage points less than the Real CPI in°ation. Particularly interesting is the
timing for the start of de°ation. The New CPI in°ation became negative in early 1993, some
two years before the real CPI in°ation turned negative in 1995. The estimation indicates
that the replacement of imputed rent data with a more desirable indicator contributes to
increasing housing prices' link to the CPI.
This kind of distortion in the estimation of imputed rent for owned-occupied housing
causes major problems with respect to CPI changes.
The distortion in the estimation of imputed rent for owner-occupied housing is not just
a CPI problem. The imputed rent for owner-occupied housing also represents a weight of
approximately 10% in the system of national accounts (SNA). And with regard to GDP size
and °uctuations, imputed rent for owner-occupied housing is the most important indicator
for ¯scal and monetary policies (along with the CPI), and at the same time, it is expected
that the proportion accounted for by it will grow increasingly larger in future. On the
other hand, it has also been pointed out that estimation of imputed rent for owner-occupied
housing is the most di±cult estimation subject when generating economic statistics, with
various estimation methods having been proposed.
In terms of estimation methods for imputed rent for owner-occupied housing, the leading
methods include the Equivalent Rent Approach, which extrapolates rent based on the sur-
rounding rental market, and the User Cost Approach, which estimates rent using housing
asset prices. However, problems have been pointed out with both of these methods.
What kind of method should be used in the estimation of imputed rent for owner-occupied
housing? What level of disparity arises based on the di®erent calculation methods?
In order to answer such questions, this study will, taking Diewert and Nakamura (2009),(2011)
as a starting point, estimate the imputed rent for owner-occupied housing in Tokyo using
multiple previously proposed methods, with the aim of clarifying the level of di®erence
arising due to the disparities between calculation methods.
In the 2010 national census, there were 13,161,751 people living in Tokyo (6,403,219
households), with an SNA production value of =Y71.181 trillion, of which imputed rent for
owner-occupied housing accounted for =Y3.0621 trillion. The ¯gures for both population and
economic power are comparable in size to those of a small country. As well, during the latter
half of the 1980s, a steep rise in real estate prices occurred, but following the collapse of
the bubble in 1990, housing prices declined steadily over a long period. Given such a large-
scale °uctuation in housing prices, we believe that clarifying the level of the di®erences that
arise in imputed rent for owner-occupied housing calculated with di®erent methods will be
extremely signi¯cant when applying them to various countries in future.
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2 The Theory of Household User Costs
2.1 Basic model of User Cost Approach
Katz (2009) reviews the theoretical framework that can be used to derive both user cost
and rental equivalence measures from the fundamental equation of capital theory:
\The user cost of capital' measure is based on the fundamental equation of capital theory.
This equation, which applies equally to both ¯nancial and non-¯nancial assets... states that
in equilibrium, the price of an asset will equal the present discounted value of the future net
income that is expected to be derived from owning it."
The user cost of capital measure provides an estimate of the market rental price based
on costs of owners. It is directly derived from the assumption that, in equilibrium, the
purchase price of a durable good will equal the discounted present value of its expected net
bene¯ts; i.e., it will equal the discounted present value of its expected future services less the
discounted present value of its expected future operating costs. To see this, let V tv denote
the purchase price of a v year old durable at the beginning of year t; let V t+1v+1 denote the
expected purchase price of the durable at the beginning of year t + 1 when the durable is
one year older; let utv denote the expected end of period value of the period t services of
this durable; let Otv denote the expected period t operating expenses to be paid at the end
of period t for the v year old durable; and let rt denote the expected nominal discount rate
(i.e., the rate of return on the best alternative investment) in year t.
Expected variables are measured as of the beginning of year t.
Assume the entire value of the durable's services in a year will be received at the year's end,
and that the durable is expected to have a service life of m years. From the de¯nition of the
discounted present value, we have
V tv =
utv
1 + rt
+
ut+1v+1
(1 + rt)(1 + rt+1)
+ ¢ ¢ ¢+ u
t+m¡v¡1
m¡1
¦t+m¡v¡1i=t (1 + ri)
(1)
¡ O
t
v
1 + rt
¡ O
t+1
v+1
(1 + rt)(1 + rt+1)
¡ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¡ O
t+m¡v¡1
m¡1
¦t+m¡v¡1i=t (1 + ri)
When the durable is one year older, the expected price of the durable at the beginning of
year t+ 1 is:
V t+1v+1 =
ut+1v+1
1 + rt+1
+
ut+2v+2
(1 + rt+1)(1 + rt+2)
+ ¢ ¢ ¢ (2)
+
ut+m¡v¡1m¡1
¦t+m¡v¡1i=t+1 (1 + ri)
¡ O
t+1
v+1
1 + rt+1
¡ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¡ O
t+m¡v¡1
m¡1
¦t+m¡v¡1i=t+1 (1 + ri)
Dividing both sides of (2) by (1 + rt) and subtracting the result from equation (1) yields
V tv ¡
V t+1v+1
1+rt+1 =
utv
1+rt ¡ O
t
v
1+rt
(3)
4
Multiplying through equation (3) by (1 + rt) and combining terms, one obtains the end
of period t user cost:
utv = r
tV tv +O
t
v ¡ (V t+1v+1 ¡ V tv ) (4)
The estimated market value of a home a year later ( V t+1v+1 ) is computed in the context
that the home has a remaining service life for the homeowner of m years.
2.2 The Verbrugge Variant (VV) of the User Cost Approach
The speci¯cation of the user cost implemented in Poole, Ptacek and Verbrugge (2005)
is based on derivations presented in Verbrugge (2008), where alternative ways of handling
the home value appreciation term are also investigated more fully. Here, we label the
formulation of the user cost presented as equation (1) in Verbrugge (2008) as the Verbrugge
variant, hereafter referred to for short as the VV user cost.
The VV user cost is derived by treating homeowners as though they costlessly sell and buy
back their homes each year.1 Stated using our notation, where V t is the beginning of period
value of the home ignoring, as Verbrugge does, the age of the home; rt is a nominal interest
rate; V t is a term which collects the rates of depreciation, maintenance, and property taxes;
and E[¼] is an estimate of the rate of expected house price appreciation, the VV user cost
formula is:
ut = rtV t + °tHV
t ¡ E[¼]V t (5)
=forgone interest+operating costs-expected (t) to (t+1) change in home value.
Verbrugge experiments with a number of alternative ways of measuring the ¯nal term
of (5) for the expected change in home value from the beginning to the end of year t, but
his preferred forecasting equation includes a forecast of the home price change based on 4
quarters of prior home price information. With this setup, changes in home prices have an
immediate within-year impact on the user cost. When home prices are rising, the ¯nal term
of (5) serves to o®set the contribution of the ¯rst term, rtV t.
2.3 Diewert's OOH Opportunity Cost Approach
The time has come, we feel, to accept the evidence of Verbrugge and others that user costs
and rents do not reliably move together! This verdict implies we must rethink the approach
1This user cost variant follows naturally from application of the statement of the user cost approach
given by Diewert (1974) in the opening quotation for section 3 about how a consumer is imagined to be
buying their home and then selling it back each period { (possibly to himself). We note that in section 6
of his paper, Verbrugge (2008) relaxes the assumption that there are no costs of buying and selling a house
and he uses this fact to try to help explain the divergence between the rental price of a home and its user
cost.
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for accounting for OOH in the price statistics of nations. We argue in the rest of this paper
for a shift to the new opportunity cost approach for accounting for the cost of housing.
The term opportunity cost refers to the cost of the best alternative that must be forgone
in taking the option chosen. Thus, we seek to compare implications for homeowner wealth
of selling at the beginning of period t with the alternatives of planning to own a home
for m more years and of either renting out or occupying the home for the coming year.
This comparison is assumed to be carried out at the beginning of period t based on the
information available then about the market value of the home and interest rates and the
forecasted average increase per year in home market value if the home is held for another m
years.
Re¯nancing can be viewed as a way of a homeowner selling or buying back a fraction of an
owned home. In contrast to selling and buying titles to properties, ¯nancing and re¯nancing
costs for mortgages and other loans secured by liens on property titles are quite low, in the
United States at least. We imagine that a homeowner mentally notes at the start of each
year the market price and the forecast for the annual average growth in value for a home
that the owner expects to hold for m more years. The homeowner is presumed to use this
information as input to decisions made at the start of the year on whether to adjust their
debt for the coming year, whether to sell at the start of the year or to plan on continuing
to own their home for m more years, and whether to rent out or occupy the home for the
coming year if they continue to own it.
Owner occupiers in period t continue to own their homes with the chosen levels of debt,
and to occupy rather than renting their homes out. Thus in choosing to own and occupy,
they pass up the opportunity of selling at the start of the period, and also the opportunity of
renting out their home that year. At the level of an individual homeowner, the opportunity
cost approach amounts to treating the cost to the owner occupant of their housing choice as
the greater of the foregone bene¯t they would have received by selling at the start of period
t or renting out the owned home and collecting the rent payments.
The owner occupied housing opportunity cost index can now be de¯ned as follows:
For each household living in owner occupied housing (OOH), the owner occupied housing
opportunity cost (OOHOC) is the maximum of what it would cost to rent an equivalent
dwelling (the rental opportunity cost, ROC) and the ¯nancial opportunity costs (FOC).
The OOHOC index for a nation is de¯ned as an expenditure share weighted sum of a
rental equivalency index and a ¯nancial opportunity cost index, with the expenditure share
weights depending on the estimated proportion of owner occupied homes for which FOC
exceeds ROC.
The Rental Opportunity Cost Component The rental opportunity cost component
is operationally equivalent to the usual rental equivalency measure, but the justi¯cation
for this component here does not rest on an appeal to the fundamental equation of capital
theory and is not tied to the potential sale value for the home in the current or subsequent
periods. In the present context, the ROC component is simply the rent for period t on an
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owned dwelling that the owner forgoes by living there that period. That is, it is the rent
the owner could have collected by renting the place out rather than living there.2
We next turn our attention to the ¯nancial opportunity cost of the money tied up in an
owned dwelling. A home, once purchased, can yield owner occupied housing services over
many years. The user cost framework provides guidance on how to infer the period-by-period
¯nancial costs of OOH services using the observable home purchase data.
We can use the user cost framework this way even in situations when the capital theory
assumptions under which the user cost equals the expected rent are not satis¯ed.
The Financial Opportunity Cost Component The user cost formulation we recom-
mend for the FOC component of the opportunity cost is referred to here as the Diewert
variant, or DV, user cost. For this speci¯cation, we let rt denote the rate of return a
homeowner could have received by investing funds that are tied up in the owned home.
In addition, we take account of the fact that many homeowners have debt that is secured
against their homes and must make regular speci¯ed payments on that debt to continue to
be in a position to occupy or to rent out their homes.
Research has shown that owner occupied homes, on the whole, exhibit little physical
depreciation over time given modern standards for home maintenance.3 (This is in contrast
to the situation for rental housing units that have been shown to lose signi¯cant value,
on average, with increasing age.) Hence, since we are focusing on owner occupied housing
here, we drop the dwelling age subscript v from this point on, as we did in introducing the
Verbrugge variant (VV) user cost in equation (5).
We also take account of the fact that the vast majority of homeowners own their homes for
many years. Indeed, if we take account as well of the phenomenon of serial home ownership,
with owner occupiers rolling forward the equity accumulated from one owned home to the
next, then the time horizon should arguably be the entire number of years a homeowner
plans to continue to live in owned housing. Many people move into their own owned homes
as soon as they can a®ord to after reaching adulthood and die still owning their own homes.
The expected remaining years, m, until a homeowner expects to withdraw all the equity
they have in their home is an important parameter for determining the FOC component.
However, if homeowner-speci¯c information about m is lacking, perhaps m could be set at a
value no lower than the median years that homeowners report having been in their present
homes.
Having stated the above choices and views, we are now ready to specify the FOC compo-
2Notice that, in computing the ROC component, we do not subtract the cost the owner would need to
incur to live somewhere else if they rented the home out. The opportunity cost of living in an owned home,
which is the maximum of the ROC and FOC components, is what the person would presumably compare
with the costs of alternative housing arrangements in making their choice about where to live for period t.
It does, however, make sense to think of the ROC value for an individual homeowner as a lower bound on
the value they place on living in the home in light of the fact that most people, in the United States at least,
seem to have a strong preference for living in owned accommodations.
3Here normal maintenance for owned homes is essentially being de¯ned to include the amount of main-
tenance and renovation expenditures required to just maintain the overall quality of the home at a constant
level.
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nent for an individual homeowner. Here we ignore the case of homeowners who have negative
home equity: a more complex and obviously important case in the present circumstances
which we are considering now in separate research with Leonard Nakamura. We also ab-
stract from transactions costs and taxes: further complications that we are also considering
in our new research with Leonard Nakamura.
As of the start of period t, a homeowner with nonnegative equity could sell, paying o®
any debt (Dt) in the process, and could collect the (non negative) sum of V t ¡Dt. Or the
homeowner could choose to continue owning the dwelling, in which case they must make
payments on any debt they have, and must pay the normal home operating costs; they must
do this whether they choose to live in their home or rent it out for the coming year. If
they continue to own the dwelling - either living in it or renting it out { they will forego
the interest they could have earned on the equity tied up in their home and will incur
maintenance costs and carrying costs on any debt, but they will also enjoy any capital gains
or incur any capital losses that materialize.
The ¯nancial user cost for owning the home in period t and living in it, discounted to the
start of period t , is:
ut
1 + rt
´ [V t ¡Dt]¡
"
¡rtDDt ¡Ot + (V t+1 ¡Dt)
1 + rt
#
; (6)
where V t+1 is the value of the home at the beginning of period t plus the expected average
appreciation of the home value over the number of years before the homeowner plans to sell.
Thus, the second term in square brackets is the forecasted expected value of the home as of
the end of period t which is the beginning of period t+1 ( V t+1) minus the period t debt
service costs ( rtDD
t) and operating costs ( Ot) that must be paid in order to either occupy
or rent out the dwelling for period t. If we multiply expression (6) through by the discount
factor, 1 + rt, we now obtain an expression for the ex ante end of period user cost:
ut ´ rtDDt + rt(V t ¡Dt) +Ot ¡ (V t+1 ¡ V t): (7)
The importance of the debt related terms in (6) and (7) can be better appreciated by
considering some speci¯c types of homeowners. Consider a type A homeowner who owns
their home free and clear. For them, the end of period user cost for period t, discounted to
the start of the period, is:
ut
1 + rt
jtypeA ´ [V t]¡
"
¡Ot + V t+1
1 + rt
#
=
Ot + rtV t ¡ (V t+1 ¡ V t)
1 + rt
: (8)
The user cost considered as of the end of the period is found by multiplying (8) through
by 1 + rt, yielding:
ut jtypeA ´ rtV t +Ot ¡ (V t+1 ¡ V t): (9)
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Notice that this is essentially the customary user cost expression, as derived by Katz
(2009) and others. This is the same basic formulation used as well by Verbrugge; e.g., see
(5) above.
Type B homeowners do not fully own their homes, but have positive home equity: the
most prevalent case for U.S. homeowners. If the homeowner were to sell at the beginning of
period t, the realized proceeds of the sale (after repaying the debt) would be V t ¡Dt. The
end of period user cost for period t for these homeowners, discounted to the start of period
t, is:
ut
1 + rt
jtypeB ´ [V t ¡Dt]¡
"
¡rtDDt ¡Ot + (V t+1 ¡Dt)
1 + rt
#
(10)
==
rtDD
t +Ot + rt(V t ¡Dt)¡ (V t+1 ¡ V t)
1 + rt
The user cost, as of the end of the period, is found by multiplying (10) through by 1+ rt:
ut jtypeB ´ rtDDt + rt(V t ¡Dt) +Ot ¡ (V t+1 ¡ V t): (11)
Type C homeowners have zero home equity. In this case, if the homeowner sells at the
start of period t, we assume simply that they get nothing from the sale. And if they continue
to own and live in the home, they do so without having any equity tied up by this choice
and hence are not foregoing any earnings on funds tied up in their home. The end of period
user cost for period t, considered as of the start of period t, is:
ut
1 + rt
jtypeC ´ ¡
"
¡rtDDt ¡Ot + (V t+1 ¡Dt)
1 + rt
#
: (12)
The user cost considered as of the end of the period is:4
ut jtypeC ´ rtDDr +Ot ¡ (V t+1 ¡ V t): (13)
We next consider the extreme case in which the interest rate for borrowing equals the
returns on investments (i.e., rtD = r
t). Now, (10) and (11) reduce to (8) and (9). That
is, the expressions for the homeowners who have debt but still have positive equity in their
homes reduce to the expressions for the user cost for the homeowners who own their dwellings
free and clear. We see, therefore, that the traditional user cost expression, as derived by
Katz, and the VV user cost implicitly assume that homeowners who have mortgages or other
home equity loans are charged an interest rate on this debt that equals the rate of return
on their ¯nancial investments.
Most well o® households have mostly low cost debt whereas many poor households mostly
have high cost debt. The importance of this fact can be demonstrated using the end of
4Note that in this zero equity case, it seems like the payments approach is justi¯ed at ¯rst glance.
However, the payments approach neglects the expected capital gains term and during periods of high or
moderate in°ation, this term must be taken into account.
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period user cost for a type B homeowner. For a homeowner who has positive home equity
and only low cost debt with rtD < r
t , expression (11) can be written as:
ut jtypeB ´ rtDDt + rt(V t ¡Dt) +Ot ¡ (V t+1 ¡ V t) (14)
== rtDV
t ¡ (rt ¡ rtD)Dt +Ot ¡ (V t+1 ¡ V t);
where the term (rt ¡ rtD) is positive. Hence, for these homeowners, higher debt reduces
the ¯nancial cost of OOH services. Indeed, this is a potential motivation for a Type B
homeowner to increase their low cost borrowing to the greatest extent possible. The only
rational constraint on doing this, from an economic perspective, is that higher debt can also
bring a greater risk of home foreclosure or personal bankruptcy in the event of a downturn
in the economy or personal problems such as job loss or illness.
The case of a homeowner with only high cost debt (i.e., with rtD > r
t ) is di®erent. Now
(11) reduces to:
ut jtypeB ´ rtDDt + rt(V t ¡Dt) +Ot ¡ (V t+1 ¡ V t) (15)
== rtV t + (rtD ¡ rt)Dt +Ot ¡ (V t+1 ¡ V t);
where (rtD ¡ rt) is positive. So now, higher debt means a higher ¯nancial cost of OOH
services. Most subprime loans are high cost, with interest rates at least three interest rate
points above Treasures of comparable maturities.
We come now to the question of how the DV user cost would behave over a housing bubble.
In this portion of our analysis, we use the general (8) expression for the end of period user
cost. Moreover, we will de¯ne rtH(m) as the expected rate of home price change under the
assumption a home will be held for m more years. Now, (7) can be rewritten as
ut ´ rtDDt + rt(V t ¡Dt)¡ rtH(m)V t +Ot (16)
== (rtD ¡ rt)Dt + (rt ¡ rtH(m))V t +Ot;
where
rtH(m)V
t = V t+1 ¡ V t
Hence the FOC for a household can be negative when, for example, the borrowing rate is
less than the expected rate of return on ¯nancial assets, and the expected rate of return on
¯nancial assets is less than the expected annual rate of return on housing assets.
However, the OOHOC for a household will never be zero or negative because it is de¯ned
as the maximum of the ROC and the FOC, with the rental opportunity cost necessarily
being positive.
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Notice also that the FOC component will rise as home prices rise, and ¯rst and foremost,
when the expected rate of return on ¯nancial investments ( rt) is greater than the expected
rate of return on the housing asset ( rtH(m)). Going into a bubble, the ¯rst term,
(rtD ¡ rt)Dt;
will be hard to forecast even in terms of sign, but we would expect the changes in this term
to be small compared to the changes in the second term,
(rt ¡ rtH(m))V t
During the expansion phase of a bubble, home values, and hence V t , will grow rapidly,
but the longer run return on housing assets should not change as much and hence the
¯nancial user cost of OOH, given by equation (16), should increase. This result underlines
the importance of incorporating longer run expectations into the user cost formula. Of
course, when the bubble bursts, the ¯nancial user cost will rapidly decline, although the
decline will be o®set somewhat by the possible decline as well in rtH(m).
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Estimation Error of Imputed rent for OOH
Targeting the owner-occupied housing market in Tokyo, after collecting as much micro-
data as possible, we estimated imputed rent for owner-occupied housing using multiple
methods.
First, we calculated it with the Equivalent Rent Approach currently employed in Japan.
The Equivalent Rent Approach is a method that forecasts housing rent levels in the case
of leasing out owner-occupied housing, using housing rental rates formed by the housing
rental market. In the case of attempting to estimate imputed rent for owner-occupied
housing with such a method, it has been pointed that bias occurs due to data limitations
and market structure disparities between the owner-occupied housing market and the rental
housing market.
For example, according to the 2008 Housing and Land Survey, the average °oor space (size)
of owner-occupied housing in Tokyo was 110.71 square meters for single-family house owner-
occupied housing and 79.36 square meters for rental housing { a discrepancy of over 30 square
meters. When it comes to condominiums, an even greater discrepancy exists, at 65.84 square
meters for owner-occupied housing and 36.06 square meters for rental housing. Moreover,
it is not just the area { a quality gap in structure, facilities, etc., also exists between owner-
occupied housing and rental housing. As a result, when attempting to estimate imputed
rent for owner-occupied housing using rental housing data, it is necessary to perform quality
adjustment.
5Locked in aspects of the ¯nancing arrangements of home buyers may also matter in this regard. We
are exploring this issue now in a follow-up study.
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However, in estimating imputed rent for owner-occupied housing in Japan, the average
rent calculated for either the country as a whole or individual prefectures is multiplied
by the aggregate owner-occupied housing area. In this case, since many rental housing
units are concentrated in urban areas, the average housing rent that is estimated is heavily
weighted on urban data. In such a situation, there is a strong possibility of overestimating
imputed rent. Meanwhile, since most rental housing units are small-scale housing of 30
square meters or less, the quality is considerably inferior. In this case, there is a strong
possibility of underestimating imputed rent. As well, since it is known that housing rents
and prices change signi¯cantly based on the location and building age, it is surely natural
to think that major measurement errors will arise if adjustment for quality di®erences is not
performed.
Besides these kinds of problems based on structural di®erences between the owner-occupied
housing and rental housing markets, problems also exist in terms of the nature of the rent
being surveyed. Since the rent surveyed via the Housing and Land Survey and consumer
price statistics is the household's paying rent, there is a strong possibility that there is a
major discrepancy with the rent determined by the current market.
The reason for this is that the lease contract period in Japan is two years, so the rent is
not changed for a two-year period after the contract is concluded (in Canada it is one year,
and rent is mostly not changed over the one-year period). As well, even if the lease contract
is renewed, it is rare for the rent to be revised to the same level as market rent at the time of
contract renewal. As a result, the rent that would likely be generated by the market at the
time of the survey and the rent being paid at that time diverge signi¯cantly (see Shimizu,
Nishimura, and Watanabe, 2010).6
Accordingly, we implemented two corrections for the Equivalent Rent Approach. The
¯rst correction was an adjustment to the rent data. We changed the household paying rent
surveyed by the CPI and Housing and Land Survey to the market rent formed at that time.
The second correction was the implementation of quality adjustment. Di®erent rents are set
depending not only on regional di®erences (such as proximity to city) but also on di®erences
within the same region, such as °oor space, distance to nearest station, time to city center,
building age, etc. Adjustment of such quality di®erences was performed using the hedonic
approach.
Next is the User Cost Approach, which attempts to estimate imputed rent from the asset
price of owner-occupied housing. The estimation method for doing so is complicated, and
it has been pointed out that there is a problem with the value becoming negative during
periods of dramatic price increases. It has also been noted that this is combined with the
problem of housing price volatility becoming greater than what it is perceived by market
players. However, a Residential Property Price Handbook (RPPI Handbook) is published
6Since the Japanese Act on Land and Building Leases strongly protects renters, increasing rent is pro-
hibited except in cases where it is allowed due to a rise in costs such as property taxes. As a result, even
when housing prices rise signi¯cantly, it is di±cult to change the rent during the lease contract term. As
well, even when a lease contract is renewed, increases in the rent amount are not allowed to exceed the
extent of cost increases.
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for estimating housing prices7, and it is anticipated that in future many countries will move
forward with aligning their housing price statistics based on this handbook.8
Accordingly, in employing the User Cost Approach, we calculated the single-family housing
price function and condominium price function using the hedonic approach recommended by
the RPPI Handbook, and then calculated the quality-adjusted asset price. Furthermore, in
the User Cost calculation, it is necessary to consider various costs. Among these, property
tax has the greatest weight. The land evaluation amount for property tax varies considerably
based on location. We therefore calculated a hedonic function based on published land value
data that is the benchmark for property tax land evaluations, and combined it with the
property tax amount for each type of dwelling unit.9
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Housing rents, housing prices and land prices
We collect housing prices and rents from a magazine or website, published by Recruit Co.,
Ltd., one of the largest vendors of residential lettings information in Japan. The Recruit
dataset covers the 23 special wards and Tama-area of Tokyo for the period 1986 (Rents:
1990) to 2010, including the bubble period in the late 1980s and its collapse to the 90s.
It contains 251,473 listings for single family house prices, 330,247 listings for condominium
prices and 1,155,078 listings for rents of single family houses and condominiums.10 Recruit
provides time-series of housing prices and rents from the week when it is ¯rst posted until
the week it is removed because of successful transaction.11 We only use the price in the ¯nal
week because this can be safely regarded as su±ciently close to the contract price.12
In addition, in order to calculate property tax amounts, we developed published land
7See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/hicp/methodology/owner occupied housing hpi/
rppi handbook with regard to the RPPI Handbook.
8In Japan, the publication of the RPPI Handbook has led to an o±ce being set up within the Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and advisory board aimed at real estate price index upgrading
being implemented through interaction between the Bank of Japan and Financial Services Agency (which
are responsible for ¯scal policy), the Cabinet O±ce (which is responsible for SNA statistics), the Ministry of
Internal A®airs and Communications Statistics Bureau (which is responsible for consumer price statistics),
the Ministry of Justice (which is responsible for housing relocation statistics), and private-sector experts,
and progress being made toward establishing a new housing price index. A new housing price index using
the method recommended in the RPPI Handbook is scheduled to be published during ¯scal 2012. The
coordination of such statistics across Japan as a whole is signi¯cant not just as a benchmark for making
¯scal and monetary decisions but also for creating the possibility of applying them to other statistics { the
estimation of imputed rent for owner-occupied housing being a leading example.
9Land evaluation for property tax purposes is determined using 70% of the published land price as a
base. For this study, we started by calculating the land price evaluation level using the published land price
base.
10Shimizu et al. (2010) report that the Recruit data cover more than 95 percent of the entire transactions
in the 23 special wards of Tokyo. On the other hand, its coverage for suburban areas is very limited. We
use only information for the units located in the special wards of Tokyo.
11There are two reasons for the listing of a unit being removed from the magazine: a successful deal or
a withdrawal (i.e. the seller gives up looking for a buyer and thus withdraws the listing). We were allowed
access information regarding which the two reasons applied for individual cases and discarded those where
the seller withdrew the listing.
12Recruit Co., Ltd. provided us with information on contract prices for about 24 percent of the entire
listings. Using this information, we were able to con¯rm that prices in the ¯nal week were almost always
identical with the contract prices (i.e., they di®ered at a probability of less than 0.1 percent).
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price data, which is the benchmark for property tax land evaluations. From 1990 to 2010,
evaluation amount data has been published for 37,479 residential areas.
Table1 shows a list of the attributes of a house. This includes ground area (L), °oor
space (S ), and front road width (W ) as key attributes of a house. The age of a house is
de¯ned as the number of months between the date of the construction of the house and the
transaction. We de¯ne south-facing dummy, SD, to indicate whether the house's windows are
south-facing or not (note that Japanese are particularly fond of sunshine). The convenience
of public transportation from each house location is represented by travel time to the central
business district (CBD),13 which is denoted by TT and time to the nearest station,14 which
is denoted by TS. We use a ward dummy,WD, to indicate di®erences in the quality of public
services available in each district, and a railway line dummy, RD, to indicate along which
railway/subway line a house is located.
Table2 shows the summary statistics for the various data. The average single family house
price is =Y66.23 million, while the average condominium price is =Y37.17 million. Looking at
the average °oor space (S ), the ¯gures are 105 square meters for single family houses and 57
square meters for condominiums, which is consistent with Land and Housing Survey results.
In other words, the data collected here is largely in accordance with single family housing
and condominium stocks.
If one looks at rent data, the average monthly rent is =Y110,000 and the average °oor space
(S ) is 38 square meters. It is clear from the data collected in this study that a signi¯cant
discrepancy exists between the average housing °oor space produced by the owner-occupied
housing market and the rental market.
The building age (A) is 15 years for single family houses, 14 years for condominiums, and
9 years for rental housing. Here, too, one can see that there is a signi¯cant discrepancy
between the owner-occupied housing market and rental market.
3.2.2 Building Usage Data
With regard to building usage, we used the Tokyo current land and building usage survey
data. This data provides information on usage status, structure, number of stories, and
°oor space for all buildings in Tokyo at four points in time (1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006)
via an inventory survey. What's more, it is provided as a database that can be used via
the Geographic Information System (GIS). With regard to housing, this study employs four
types of building usage: single family houses, condominiums, housing joint industrial usage,
13Travel time to the CBD is measured as follows. The metropolitan area of Tokyo is composed of 23
wards centering on the Tokyo Station area and containing a dense railway network. Within this area, we
choose seven railway/subway stations as the central stations, which include Tokyo, Shinagawa, Shibuya,
Shinjuku, Ikebukuro, Ueno, and Otemachi. Then, we de¯ne travel time to the CBD by the minutes needed
to commute to the nearest of the seven stations in the daytime.
14The time to the nearest station, TS, is de¯ned as walking time to a nearest station if a house is located
within the walking distance from a station, and the sum of walking time to a bus stop and onboard time
from the bus stop to a nearest station if a house is located in a bus transportation area within walking
distance from a station. We use a bus dummy, BD, to indicate whether a house is located in a walking
distance area from a station or in a bus transportation area.
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Table 1: List of Variables
Symbol Variable Content Unit
S Floor space Floor space of building square meters
L Ground area Ground area of housing/building square meters
W Road Width Road width in front of housing meters
A
Age of building at the time of
transaction
Age of building at the time of transaction. years
TS Distance to the nearest station
Distance to the nearest station by Walk or
Bus or Car.
meters
TT Travel time to Tokyo station Average railway riding time in daytime to the
Tokyo station.
minutes
Steel reinforced concrete frame structure = 1
Other structure = 0
Reinforced concrete frame structure = 1
Other structure = 0
Light-gauge steel frame structure = 1
Other structure = 0
Wood frame structure = 1
Other structure = 0
k- th administrative district  =1,
Other district  =0.
l- th railway line  =1
Other railway line = 0.
RC
Reinforced concrete
dummy
(0,1)
LGT
Light-gauge steel
dummy
(0,1)
SRC Steel reinforced concrete
dummy
(0,1)
Wood
Wood frame structure
dummy
(0,1)
RD l  (l=0,… ,L) Railway line dummy (0,1)
LD k   (k=0,… ,K)
Location (ward or
municipalities) dummy
(0,1)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Housing Data
Single family house data:
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Sibngle family house price data (251,473 observations)
P :price (10,000 Yen) of unit 6,623.83 3,619.20 1,280 29,990
S : Floor space (m2) 105.48 38.93 50 448
P  / S  (10,000 Yen) 72.47 30.11 25 479
A : Age of building (years) 15.20 8.34 0 55
TS : DIstance to the nearest station (meters) 811.68 374.22 80 2,800
TT : Travel time to terminal station (minutes) 34.48 11.12 1 144
W : Road Width 4.88 1.88 2 20
Condominium price data:
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Condominium price data (330,247 observations)
P :price (10,000 Yen) of unit 3,717.52 2,250.71 390 33,500
S : Floor space (m2) 57.83 18.29 15 110
P  / S  (10,000 Yen) 66.22 35.73 25 315
A : Age of building (years) 14.23 8.74 0 55
TS : DIstance to the nearest station (meters) 682.68 366.10 80 2,480
TT : Travel time to terminal station (minutes) 30.10 12.63 1 144
Land price data:
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Land price data (37,479 observations)
P  / S  (10,000 Yen) per square meter 43.11 40.90 5 1,230
L : Land area (m2) 191.66 128.75 40 4,069
TS : DIstance to the nearest station (meters) 1,142.28 1,001.50 60 9,200
TT : Travel time to terminal station (minutes) 42.90 16.70 7 126
W : Road Width 5.44 2.45 2 38
Housing rent data:
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Housing rent data (1,155,078 observations)
P :rent (10,000 Yen/month) of unit 11.23 6.48 2 60
S : Floor space (m2) 38.27 20.85 10 120
P  / S  (10,000 Yen) 0.31 0.09 0.1 2.0
A : Age of building (years) 9.74 8.11 0 55
TS : DIstance to the nearest station (meters) 614.87 350.25 80 7,040
TT : Travel time to terminal station (minutes) 30.45 11.56 1 126
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and housing joint commercial usage.
The fact that data is provided in a form that may be used with the GIS is highly signi¯cant.
It is known that there are considerable price gaps in housing prices and rent based on location
in combination with building characteristics. As a result, one may expect that these location
di®erences will cause signi¯cant bias in the estimation of imputed rent for owner- occupied
housing. Accordingly, using the GIS, we obtained the \distance to nearest station" and
\time to city center(Tokyo station)," which are believed to be key variables in terms of the
factors determining housing prices in Tokyo.15
However, the data is lacking when it comes to the \Age of building (A)" for each building.
Accordingly, we calculated the average building age for single family houses and condomini-
ums by administrative district (city/ward) based on the Housing and Land Survey.16
Table3 summarizes building data prepared in combination with Housing and Land Survey
data. 17First, there was little change in single family houses from 1990 (1.857 million houses)
to 1995 (1.855 million houses), but the number grew considerably from 2000 (1.897 million
houses) to 2005 (2.011 million houses). With regard to condominiums, there were 367,000
units in 1990, 374,000 units in 1995, and 381,000 units in 2000, which rose signi¯cantly to
417,000 units in 2005. The increase in total °oor space for condominiums was especially
signi¯cant.
With the Housing and Land Survey, along with the total °oor space, it is possible to know
the proportion of owner-occupied housing. If we focus on the percentage of owner-occupied
housing, the rate was 89% for single family houses in 1990, but in 2005 it had risen to 94%.
The rate rose considerably for condominiums as well, from 28% in 1990 to 39% in 2005.
We believe the proportion of owner-occupied housing increased during this period because
housing prices dropped substantially, along with a reduction in mortgage rates.
3.3 Estimation of Rental Value and Capital Value per Housing
3.3.1 Hedonic Estimation Residential Rent, Condominium, Single Family House
and Land.
We estimated a hedonic function using housing rent data, single family house price data,
condominium price data, and land price data.
In calculating the rent and housing price by dwelling unit for each year, we estimated the
15With regard to the distance to the nearest station, the closest station was de¯ned as the closest station
from the center of the building. Based on that, the road distance was measured using the GIS. As well, with
regard to the time from the nearest station to Tokyo Station, the average day-time travel time was added,
in the same way as for the rental/housing price data.
16The Housing and Land Survey includes the number of stocks by year of construction. Accordingly, we
calculated the average age of buildings by municipality based on the year of construction, and calculated
the Age of Building (A) based on the time elapsed until the time of calculation.
17We can see a di®erences between a) and e), c) and f). The di®erences come from the survey method.
the Tokyo current land and building usage survey is Census, on the other hand, the Housing and Land
Survey is Sample survey.
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Table 3: Buildings Survey
Housing Survey Building Survey
b) / a) d) /c) e)Total* (units)** f)Total* (units)***
1990 160,662,570 143,150,350 89.10% 108,909,068 31,452,939 28.88% 148,834,033 1,857,722 107,274,134 367,734
1995 168,371,522 153,351,080 91.08% 135,811,068 42,833,050 31.54% 160,654,688 1,854,315 135,778,868 374,807
2000 185,103,543 167,169,249 90.31% 162,879,280 59,920,560 36.79% 174,379,864 1,897,345 161,698,203 381,216
2005 182,850,330 173,046,939 94.64% 184,044,399 71,923,616 39.08% 181,977,956 2,011,068 186,759,564 417,872
*unit: square meter
**Number of single family houses
***Number of condominium buildings(not unit)
Single family
house
Condominium
a)Total*
b)Owner
occupied
housing*
c)Total*
d)Owner
occupied
housing*
Single family house Condominium
following hedonic function incorporating temporal changes along with structural changes in
rent/price formation mechanisms.
¹ijt = Xit¯t + Àit (17)
Here, ¹ijtis the property rent/price of type j of building i at a point in time t per square
meter while j is a characteristic vector relating to the size and building age of the property. j
signi¯es the type of rent or price: single family house price, condominium price, or land price
(published land price), along with single family house rent and condominium (apartment
building) rent.
As well, it is known that the characteristic price ¯t in the hedonic function changes over
time (Shimizu et al., 2010). As a result, in order to control for changes in characteristic
price ¯t as time passes, we estimated hedonic equations for each period t.
The estimation results are shown in Table4 and Table5.
Looking at the hedonic equation estimation results, the coe±cient of determination for the
single family house price function °uctuates within a range of 0.5 to 0.65, with its explanatory
power being lower than that of other models. For single family houses, there is a high degree
of heterogeneity compared to the condominium price function, rent function, etc., and we
believe it is necessary to incorporate factors such as the surrounding environment. On the
other hand, the land price function using real estate appraisal prices has a strong explanatory
power, at 0.85 or more across all periods. We believe this is because there is no need to
consider the building's structure since it is the land price only and because much of the noise
accompanying transactions is eliminated by the real estate appraisal price.
However, for the single family house price function, condominium price function, land
price function, and housing rent function alike, the sign functions of the estimated values for
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Table 4: Estimation Results of Hedonic Equations 1
Single family house price model Condominium price model
Year Intercept logS logW logA logTS logTT Number Adj.R2 Intercept logS logA logTS logTT RC Number Adj.R2
1986 4.15 0.04 0.21 -0.05 -0.04 -0.16 2,502 0.53 4.872 -0.019 -0.152 -0.026 -0.179 -0.007 7,604 0.65
1987 4.18 0.02 0.28 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 2,805 0.66 5.159 0.061 -0.139 0.004 -0.272 -0.034 6,312 0.71
1988 5.02 -0.06 0.26 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 2,680 0.61 6.058 -0.072 -0.166 -0.018 -0.295 -0.025 7,368 0.72
1989 5.52 0.01 0.23 -0.01 -0.09 -0.24 2,430 0.58 6.386 -0.097 -0.176 -0.030 -0.300 -0.020 15,336 0.73
1990 6.10 -0.08 0.25 -0.02 -0.07 -0.28 2,414 0.54 6.803 -0.143 -0.159 -0.017 -0.334 -0.024 13,680 0.75
1991 6.02 -0.05 0.20 -0.03 -0.09 -0.27 2,430 0.52 6.600 -0.124 -0.195 -0.025 -0.290 -0.027 14,708 0.73
1992 5.82 -0.03 0.14 -0.05 -0.10 -0.23 2,586 0.52 6.397 -0.109 -0.207 -0.026 -0.270 -0.028 17,065 0.70
1993 5.46 -0.06 0.14 -0.04 -0.07 -0.18 2,747 0.51 5.915 -0.048 -0.210 -0.020 -0.239 -0.017 17,647 0.66
1994 5.16 -0.08 0.12 -0.03 -0.04 -0.13 3,775 0.49 5.563 -0.004 -0.224 -0.018 -0.207 -0.020 19,647 0.61
1995 5.25 -0.11 0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.13 4,800 0.49 5.213 0.060 -0.254 -0.021 -0.207 -0.015 19,282 0.57
1996 4.99 -0.08 0.11 -0.04 -0.03 -0.13 5,022 0.46 4.933 0.093 -0.244 -0.025 -0.196 -0.015 15,476 0.63
1997 4.67 -0.08 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 9,706 0.46 5.018 0.080 -0.247 -0.022 -0.214 -0.016 14,037 0.63
1998 4.98 -0.13 0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 12,511 0.44 4.796 0.092 -0.228 -0.017 -0.201 -0.017 13,846 0.62
1999 4.77 -0.08 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 11,217 0.50 4.761 0.085 -0.228 -0.020 -0.193 -0.017 13,132 0.66
2000 4.72 -0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.11 11,151 0.50 4.856 0.089 -0.228 -0.026 -0.218 -0.017 12,778 0.66
2001 4.71 -0.08 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 14,212 0.59 4.918 0.063 -0.219 -0.029 -0.213 -0.019 12,879 0.66
2002 4.58 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.15 15,761 0.53 4.951 0.051 -0.201 -0.037 -0.207 -0.027 10,369 0.67
2003 4.86 -0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 18,022 0.54 5.007 0.044 -0.213 -0.037 -0.210 -0.018 9,787 0.70
2004 4.89 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.17 18,731 0.51 5.097 0.040 -0.204 -0.048 -0.219 -0.012 9,987 0.69
2005 4.63 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.12 20,732 0.55 5.050 0.023 -0.214 -0.038 -0.198 -0.013 12,223 0.72
2006 4.82 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.15 20,805 0.58 5.125 0.020 -0.218 -0.046 -0.193 -0.012 12,853 0.71
2007 5.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.17 19,208 0.62 4.877 0.054 -0.206 -0.041 -0.163 -0.014 13,693 0.74
2008 5.36 -0.08 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -0.19 16,177 0.61 4.909 0.067 -0.206 -0.053 -0.158 -0.023 14,150 0.72
2009 5.70 -0.20 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.17 14,429 0.63 5.042 0.072 -0.226 -0.055 -0.196 -0.031 10,920 0.72
2010 5.86 -0.22 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.19 14,620 0.63 5.243 0.034 -0.219 -0.042 -0.224 -0.023 15,468 0.72
*The dependent variable in each case is the log price per square meter.
**The table indicate the coefficient of main variables which a part of hedonic estimation results per year.
***Estimation Method: Robust Regression
Table 5: Estimation Results of Hedonic Equations 2
Published land price model Housing rent model
Year Intercept logL logW logA logTS logTT Number Adj.R2 Intercept logS logA logTS logTT LGT Number Adj.R2
1990 7.83 0.1974 0.40 - -0.26 -0.99 1,201 0.85 2.83 -0.21 -0.05 -0.03 -0.21 -0.10 33,172 0.71
1991 7.84 0.1993 0.39 - -0.26 -1.00 1,201 0.85 3.01 -0.22 -0.05 -0.03 -0.21 -0.10 17,622 0.69
1992 7.57 0.1839 0.38 - -0.24 -0.95 1,202 0.85 3.00 -0.23 -0.06 -0.03 -0.20 -0.08 18,741 0.69
1993 7.14 0.1568 0.31 - -0.21 -0.88 1,516 0.86 3.03 -0.23 -0.07 -0.03 -0.21 -0.07 22,257 0.70
1994 6.64 0.1297 0.28 - -0.19 -0.76 1,776 0.86 3.14 -0.21 -0.10 -0.04 -0.22 -0.07 29,477 0.67
1995 6.44 0.1154 0.25 - -0.17 -0.71 1,969 0.86 3.09 -0.24 -0.06 -0.04 -0.21 -0.04 39,609 0.67
1996 6.24 0.1059 0.22 - -0.16 -0.66 1,969 0.86 3.05 -0.25 -0.03 -0.04 -0.20 -0.02 56,846 0.67
1997 6.15 0.0897 0.20 - -0.16 -0.62 1,943 0.87 3.11 -0.27 -0.02 -0.04 -0.21 -0.03 62,482 0.69
1998 6.17 0.0861 0.19 - -0.16 -0.62 1,944 0.87 3.23 -0.28 -0.03 -0.05 -0.22 -0.04 68,517 0.70
1999 6.22 0.0891 0.17 - -0.16 -0.64 1,944 0.87 3.24 -0.29 -0.03 -0.04 -0.21 -0.04 73,701 0.71
2000 6.37 0.0931 0.16 - -0.18 -0.68 1,949 0.87 3.22 -0.30 -0.03 -0.04 -0.21 -0.03 72,248 0.72
2001 6.56 0.0971 0.15 - -0.19 -0.72 1,951 0.87 3.21 -0.28 -0.03 -0.05 -0.22 -0.02 90,725 0.71
2002 6.72 0.1008 0.14 - -0.20 -0.75 1,986 0.87 3.18 -0.28 -0.03 -0.05 -0.21 -0.04 98,674 0.73
2003 6.92 0.1034 0.13 - -0.22 -0.80 1,986 0.87 3.12 -0.28 -0.03 -0.05 -0.21 -0.04 101,845 0.74
2004 7.03 0.1082 0.13 - -0.23 -0.83 1,984 0.86 3.07 -0.27 -0.03 -0.05 -0.20 -0.04 93,292 0.72
2005 7.15 0.1149 0.13 - -0.23 -0.86 1,945 0.86 3.02 -0.26 -0.03 -0.05 -0.19 -0.03 82,057 0.71
2006 7.20 0.1227 0.13 - -0.24 -0.88 1,934 0.86 3.16 -0.27 -0.03 -0.05 -0.22 -0.03 67,287 0.73
2007 7.45 0.1403 0.13 - -0.25 -0.93 1,856 0.87 3.18 -0.27 -0.03 -0.06 -0.23 -0.02 50,159 0.75
2008 7.68 0.1513 0.14 - -0.26 -0.96 1,809 0.87 3.16 -0.29 -0.04 -0.05 -0.20 -0.02 35,409 0.76
2009 7.60 0.1582 0.12 - -0.26 -0.95 1,730 0.86 3.00 -0.30 -0.04 -0.05 -0.16 0.00 21,700 0.76
2010 7.58 0.1454 0.12 - -0.27 -0.94 1,684 0.86 2.86 -0.31 -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.01 19,258 0.78
*The dependent variable in each case is the log price per square meter.
1,155,078
**The table indicate the coefficient of main variables which a part of hedonic estimation results per year.
***Estimation Method: Robust Regression
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the \Age of building (A)," \Distance to nearest station (TS )," and \Travel time to terminal
station (TT )" were consistent, so it was determined that we were able to obtain reliable
results.
3.3.2 Forecast of Rental Value, Capital Value and Rent / Price ratio
Using the estimated hedonic function, we predicted the rent, housing price, and land price
for the various dwelling units for the previously prepared building data. First, we outline
the respective changes in average price for the forecast results in Table 6 and Figure1.18 We
calculated the price per 1m for single family house prices and condominium prices and the
rent per 1 square meter per year for single family house rents and condominium rents (in
Figure 1, 2000 is taken as 1). As well, we calculated the rent/price ratio for each type of
dwelling unit and obtained the average value.
Single family house prices and condominium prices peaked in 1990 then reversed direction,
whereas rents peaked in 1991 or 1992 before reversing direction. As well, in terms of the
extent of the °uctuation, one can see that rents °uctuated less than prices.
These di®erences in the price changes for both types of housing can also be seen based on
changes in the rent/price ratio. The rent/price ratio increased for both from 1990 through
2004. In other words, this means that the rate of decrease for housing prices was faster than
the rate of decrease for housing rents.
Subsequently, prices turned to an increase with the occurrence of a mini-bubble while
rents continued to decrease steadily, so the rent/price ratio turned to a decrease.
3.3.3 Estimation of Equivalent Rent
Using the estimated hedonic rent function, we calculated the equivalent rent for Tokyo's
23 wards (Table6). In addition to showing the estimated equivalent rent, Table 7 compares
it with the GDP, the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing in the GDP, and imputed rent
in prefectural accounting.
First, looking at changes in the proportion of the GDP represented by the imputed rent
for owner-occupied housing, the rate was 6.25% in 1990, but it has risen signi¯cantly over
the years to 7.4% in 1995, 8.5% in 2000, 9.08% in 2005, and 9.92% in 2009. In Japan, not
only did the proportion of owner-occupied housing rise, but we believe that the relative
importance of imputed rent increased due to the accumulation of owned houses as stock
that occurred with production and consumption stagnating under de°ationary conditions.
When we compare the aggregate imputed rent for owner-occupied housing in prefectural
accounting to the imputed rent for owner-occupied housing in national accounting, one can
see here that a signi¯cant discrepancy exists between the two.
18Here, we forecast housing prices and rents using hedonic function estimate values for all periods, based
on building stocks in the baseline year of 1990, and then calculated the average value. In other words, it is
a weighted average based on 1990 baseline stocks.
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Figure 1: Hedonic Price and Rents Indexes
The imputed rent for owner-occupied housing in national accounting is calculated by
multiplying rent unit prices by the total °oor space of owner-occupied housing surveyed by
the Housing and Land Survey.
On the other hand, in prefectural accounting, imputed rent is calculated as \owner-
occupied housing" as part of the breakdown of entrepreneurial income (after receivable
and payable of distributed income of corporations). This entrepreneurial income is de¯ned
as the presumed real estate income in the hypothetical case where the owner of a home
operated a real estate business, and it is calculated by subtracting intermediate input such
as repair costs, consumption of ¯xed capital, taxes such as property tax, interest payments
on mortgages, and rent payments from the imputed rent for owner-occupied housing (the
revenue).19
Here, we compared the equivalent rent estimated from the hedonic rent function estimated
in this study to the SNA imputed rent for owner-occupied housing in Tokyo. The discrepancy
between the two was especially signi¯cant at the bubble's peak in 1990, with an 11-fold
discrepancy in 1990 and a 10.5-fold discrepancy in 1991. This discrepancy has grown smaller
over the years, contracting to 1.6-fold in 2009.
A more important problem here is that the imputed rent estimated with SNA increased
8.2-fold from 1990 to 2009, whereas the estimated equivalent rent has remained stable, rising
1.18-fold. How can these kinds of di®erences be explained?
19In national accounting as well, under the same de¯nition, \owner-occupied housing" is calculated as
part of the breakdown of \entrepreneurial income (after receivable and payable of distributed income of
corporations)," with the amount being =Y22.6 trillion in 2009. Even though the de¯nition was the same,
there is a discrepancy of =Y4 trillion.
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Table 6: Estimation Results of Hedonic Indexes for Housing Prices and Rents
Year
Single family
house price
(10,000yen/m2)
Condominium
price
(10,000yen/m2)
Single family
house rent
(10,000yen/m2)
Condominium
rent
(10,000yen/m2)
Rent / Price
ratio: Single
family
house(%)
Rent / Price
ratio:
Condominium
(%)
1986 49.48 41.43 - - - -
1987 90.24 73.83 - - - -
1988 96.74 72.05 - - - -
1989 100.03 81.86 - - - -
1990 118.88 101.79 2.70 2.97 2.31% 2.96%
1991 106.19 90.96 2.94 3.28 2.82% 3.68%
1992 90.46 79.64 2.94 3.11 3.32% 3.97%
1993 80.50 71.59 2.77 3.02 3.49% 4.25%
1994 72.43 64.84 2.72 2.98 3.77% 4.62%
1995 67.19 53.41 2.68 2.95 4.02% 5.56%
1996 62.83 48.99 2.67 2.94 4.25% 6.04%
1997 60.97 47.80 2.65 2.92 4.37% 6.15%
1998 60.15 45.19 2.63 2.87 4.41% 6.37%
1999 53.84 43.17 2.62 2.83 4.88% 6.60%
2000 52.20 41.76 2.57 2.76 4.93% 6.65%
2001 48.97 40.85 2.54 2.76 5.21% 6.79%
2002 46.63 41.16 2.58 2.80 5.53% 6.85%
2003 47.81 41.17 2.54 2.74 5.34% 6.70%
2004 46.03 41.43 2.53 2.70 5.54% 6.60%
2005 46.03 42.10 2.49 2.67 5.47% 6.41%
2006 48.77 44.18 2.51 2.71 5.21% 6.22%
2007 53.09 49.60 2.57 2.68 4.93% 5.51%
2008 52.26 50.40 2.52 2.61 4.92% 5.28%
2009 51.21 47.12 2.46 2.57 4.96% 5.56%
2010 53.09 49.67 2.40 2.50 4.73% 5.13%
22
In terms of the factors causing a more than 10-fold discrepancy at the bubble's peak, it
cannot be explained simply by the di®erence in quality between owner-occupied housing
and rented housing that has frequently been pointed out. As well, as seen in Figure 1,
rental housing unit prices have been on a downward trend over the years since the bubble's
peak. Meanwhile, with respect to owner-occupied housing stock, condominiums increased
2.2-fold from 1990 through 2005, whereas single family houses { which have the most weight
{ remained stable, increasing 1.2-fold (40% increase in aggregate °oor space). Given this
context, it is not possible to explain the 8.2-fold increase from 1990 through 2009.
We believe the most important factor giving rise to this kind of discrepancy is that during
the bubble period and subsequent collapse period, when the housing market °uctuated sig-
ni¯cantly, it was not possible to su±ciently link the \paid rent" used in calculating imputed
rent to the rent determined by the market, so a signi¯cant discrepancy arose between them.
This analysis is consistent with the results of Shimizu, Nishimura, and Watanabe (2010).
However, even though there was a discrepancy between paid rent and market rent, it cannot
explain the problem of a greater than 8-fold expansion from 1990 through 2009.
3.4 Comparison of Imputed Rent of Owner-Occupied Housing in
Tokyo
3.4.1 The Treatment of Cost Tied to Owner-Occupied Housing
Next, we will estimate the imputed rent for owner-occupied housing using the User Cost
Approach. When attempting to estimate the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing using
the User Cost Approach, whether the Basic User Cost Approach, Verbrugge Variant (VV)
User Cost Approach, or Diewert's OOH Opportunity Cost Approach, it is necessary to
calculate the expense of keeping a home. The expense of keeping a home is comprised of
the opportunity cost when viewing the home as a ¯nancial asset, property tax arising from
keeping a home, damage insurance costs, and maintenance/administration costs. Here, we
take into account property tax and maintenance/administration costs.20
Financial Opportunity Cost (FOC) In many cases, purchasing a home involves ob-
taining a mortgage. In this kind of typical case, the Financial Opportunity Cost (FOC) of
home ownership is calculated as rtDD
t + rt(V t ¡Dt), as shown in Equation7. The FOC in
this case is the mortgage payment interest combined with the investment gains that could
have been obtained if that money had been invested. Since the mortgage amount is not
considered in Equation4 and Equation5, Equation7 is the case where the mortgage is 0.
For rtD
21, this study used loan interest rates from the former Government Housing Loan
20Since damage insurance costs are extremely low, we decided not to consider them in this study.
21In recent years, mortgages from private ¯nancial institutions have come to be used, but prior to 2000,
it was normal to use mortgages from the former Government Housing Loan Corporation. As well, even now,
the interest rate set by the Japan Housing Finance Agency is the benchmark for mortgage interest. Given
this, we believed that its rates were representative. The average loan interest from the Government Housing
Loan Corporation was 0.0527 in 1990, which °uctuated over time to 0.0363 in 1995, 0.0278 in 2000, 0.0308
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Corporation (now the Japan Housing Finance Agency) and the yield on 10-year Japanese
government bonds for the asset investment yield.22
Property Tax It is now supposed that the owner of the housing unit must pay the
property taxes T
0
S
and T
0
L
for the use of the structure and land respectively during period
0.23 De¯ne the period 0 structures tax rate ¿0
S
and land tax rate ¿0
L
as follows:
¿0
S
´ T 0
S
=P 0
S
Q0
S
(18)
¿0
L
´ T 0
L
=P 0
L
Q0
L
(19)
The new imputed rent for using the property during period 0, R0, including the property
tax costs, is de¯ned as follows:
R0 ´ V 0(1 + r0) + T 0S + T 0L ¡ V 1a (20)
= [P 0SQ
0
S + P
0
LQ
0
L](1 + r
0) + ¿0SP
0
SQ
0
S + ¿
0
LP
0
LQ
0
L ¡ [P 0S(1 + i0S)(1¡ ±0)Q0S + P 0L(1 + i0L)Q0L]
= p0SQ
0
S + p
0
LQ
0
L
where separate period 0 tax adjusted user costs of structures and land, p0S and p
0
L , are
de¯ned as follows:
p0S ´ [(1 + r0)¡ (1 + i0S)(1¡ ±0) + ¿0S ]P 0S = [r0 ¡ i0S + ±0(1 + i0S) + ¿0S ]P 0S (21)
p0L ´ [(1 + r0)¡ (1 + i0L) + ¿0L]P 0L = [r0 ¡ i0L + ¿0S ]P 0L (22)
Here, the question of how P 0S or P
0
L was calculated is important. We estimated P
0
L with
the hedonic function using published land prices that are the benchmark for property tax
land evaluation. The estimation results are as shown in Table5.
Using these hedonic function estimation results, we estimated the land evaluation amount
by building unit. In addition, we obtained the building price by deducting the land eval-
uation amount based on the published land price from the estimated total housing price
amount.
The nominal property tax rate was 1.4% of the asset amount for both buildings and land.
However, the actual e®ective tax rate is known to be lower than that level. Accordingly, we
estimated the e®ective tax rate for Tokyo.24
in 2005, and 0.0343 in 2010.
22The yield on 10-year government bonds from 1990 to 2010 peaked at 0.052 in 1990, dropping to 0.0346
in 1995, 0.0183 in 2000, 0.0140 in 2005, and 0.0117 in 2010. However, throughout the period in question, it
may be considered one of the assets that o®ered the highest return on investment.
23If there is no breakdown of the property taxes into structures and land components, then just impute
the overall tax into structures and land components based on the beginning of the period values of both
components.
24In property tax land evaluation, various adjustments are performed, such as relief measures for small-
scale residential land. As a result, tax amounts are not necessarily determined based on the land evaluation
24
Maintenance and Renovation Expenditure Another problem associated with home
ownership is the treatment of maintenance expenditures, major repair expenditures and
expenditures associated with renovations or additions.
Empirical evidence suggests that the normal decline in a structure due to the e®ects of
aging and use can be o®set by maintenance and renovation expenditures. How exactly
should these expenditures be treated in the context of modeling the costs and bene¯ts of
home ownership?
A common approach in the national accounts literature is to treat major renovation and
repair expenditures as capital formation and smaller routine maintenance and repair expen-
ditures as current expenditures.
Accordingly, we calculated annual maintenance/administration costs in this study as well.
Housing maintenance/administration costs may be expected to change in accordance with
home size. We therefore calculated maintenance/administration costs per square meter
based on a Recruit survey of home buyers, and multiplied this cost by the size (S ) of the
home. 25
The values based on this survey are for ¯scal 2005 only. We therefore estimated the values
for other ¯scal years based on the 2005 estimate values and the rate of change for \Repairs
& maintenance" in the Tokyo CPI.
3.5 Capital Gain
The most important element in the User Cost Approach is capital gain.
In the Basic User Cost Approach (Equation4), it is de¯ned as (V t+1v+1 ¡ V tv ), which is the
price change for each dwelling unit.
However, in the VV User Cost Approach and Diewert's User Cost Approach, it is de¯ned
as the expected value for a future period. The reason for this is that it is di±cult to assume
that in household accounting, the choice of home is made by looking at the price change for
a single year and then making an investment, and because the volatility in the actual value
of single-year capital gains becomes excessive.
For the present estimate, in the basic model we made the calculation with the actual value
of (V t+1v+1 ¡ V tv ) for each dwelling unit.
On the other hand, for the calculation of VV User Cost and Diewert's User Cost, capital
gain was obtained as (V t+1¡ V t). The anticipated growth rate ( E[¼]) was obtained as the
amount. Accordingly, we obtained the tax base amount for Tokyo as a whole (the total price determined as
the land price for actual taxation purposes) as a proportion of the land asset amount calculated with SNA
statistics. The land asset amount calculated with SNA uses published land prices for land price data and
uses data adjusted for property taxes for °oor space. As a result, both proportions are similar in that they
are proportions of the published land price and property tax land evaluation amount.
25In Recruit's survey, housing °oor space and the actual maintenance/administration costs corresponding
to it were surveyed. In the 2005 survey, data was collected for 48,532 condominiums and 23,200 single
family houses in Tokyo. Maintenance/administration costs for the 2005 year were =Y3,130 per square meter
(annually) for condominiums and =Y920 per square meter (annually) for single family houses. Multiplying
these amounts by the average °oor space of 60 square meters for condominiums and 100 square meters for
single family houses, the annual cost was =Y187,000 for condominiums and =Y92,000 for single family houses.
25
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Figure 2: The trend of single family house prices in municipalities
geometric average of the rate of change over the past 5 years by municipality unit (k). 26
We estimated the price for a future period by multiplying the anticipated growth rate
obtained in the above manner by the asset price for each property unit, and obtained the
capital gain with
(V t+1 ¡ V t)
Figure2 and Figure3 look at the maximum and minimum values and median value for the
anticipated growth rate in municipalities (k). If we compare the average value of the change
rate for the actual value(V t+1v+1=V
t
v )(Figure1), the volatility is considerably reduced here.
When looking at the actual value, both single family house prices and condominium prices
rose by a maximum of 80% for one year during the bubble period, but when converted into
anticipated growth rate, the increase is reduced to around 20%. However, even for the
anticipated growth rate, during the time of dramatic price increases in the bubble period,
there are municipalities demonstrating a median value of 15% and maximum value of 20%
for both single family house prices and condominium prices.
The anticipated growth rate by municipality dropped rapidly due to the bubble's collapse
and became negative. It then turned upward again during the so-called mini-bubble of the
mid-2000s.
26The city of Tokyo was divided into a total of 53 areas: 23 special wards and 30 municipalities. It has
become evident that moving to a new location outside of one's administrative district happens very rarely.
As well, it is known that housing price changes vary considerably by region. As a result, we deemed it
appropriate to calculate anticipated growth rate by administrative district.
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Figure 3: The trend of condominium prices in municipalities
3.6 Comparison of Estimated User Costs
Using the various parameters established as shown above, we obtained the Basic User
Cost based on Equation 4, the VV User Cost based on Equation 5, and Diewert's User Cost
based on Equation 7. As well, we calculated Diewert's OOH Index taking the maximum
value of the results obtained with Diewert's User Cost and Equivalent Rent.
Diewert's OOH Index takes the maximum value when Diewert's User Cost and Equivalent
Rent are compared. Figure4 looks at the changes over time in the ratio of Diewert's User
Cost > Equivalent Rent for both single family house and condominium prices.
User Cost increases while the anticipated growth rate is decreasing. As a result, in 1992
and 1994 through 1995, periods when the anticipated growth rate dropped considerably,
User Cost signi¯cantly surpassed Equivalent Rent. On the other hand, in the 2000s, when
the rate of decrease in housing prices shrunk and then prices began to turn upward, User
Cost decreased. As a result, one can see that the Diewert's User Cost > Equivalent Rent
ratio dropped rapidly, and the proportion of Diewert's OOH Index composed by Equivalent
Rent grew larger.
The various User Cost estimate results are outlined in Table7, while Figure5 looks at
changes in them.In 1991, VV User Cost and Diewert's User Cost were negative. This was
due to the residual e®ect of the dramatic increase in housing prices in the bubble period.
On the other hand, since prices turned downward during the one-year period from 1990 to
1991, the Basic User Cost value was extremely high. It was six times higher than Equivalent
Rent.
As well, in the mid-2000s, when housing prices turned upward, Basic User Cost had a
27
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Figure 4: Ratio: Diewert User Cost >Equivalent Rent: (%)
negative value. And for VV User Cost as well, which uses the expected increase rate for
housing prices, the value became negative in 2007, at the time of the so-called mini-bubble
(Diewert's User Cost was positive).
In order to resolve this kind of problem, employing the maximum value of Equivalent
Rent and User Cost in each year for each type of dwelling measurement unit with Diewert's
OOH Index has been proposed. For example, in 1991, when User Cost was negative for all
dwelling units, since Equivalent Rent was higher for all dwelling units, Diewert's OOH Index
is the same as Equivalent Rent. From 1992 through 1995, since capital gain is negative, the
weight of User Cost becomes greater. And in 1996, when User Cost exceeded Equivalent
Rent for all dwelling units, Diewert's OOH Index is the same as User Cost.
The discrepancy between Diewert's OOH Index and Equivalent Rent becomes greater
when the Diewert's User Cost > Equivalent Rent ratio increases. It was greatest in 1995,
when a 3.6-fold discrepancy occurred. One can see that it subsequently grew smaller, con-
tracting toward the same level as Equivalent Rent.
4 Concluding Remarks
Having an extremely large weight in national accounting and consumer price statistics,
imputed rent for owner-occupied housing plays an important role. It has been pointed out
that it is one of the most di±cult estimation subjects and various estimation methods have
been proposed, but there is still no standardized international approach.
Looking at the case of Tokyo, this study collected as much micro-data as possible and
estimated the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing using multiple estimation methods,
28
Table 7: Estimation results of User Costs
Year
a) Equivalent
Rent*
b) Basic User
Cost*
c) VV User
Cost*
d) Diewert User
Cost* e) Diewert Index* d) -b)* d) - c)* e) - a)*
1991 5,381.91 34,917.15 -17,249.25 -16,969.24 5,381.91 -51,886.39 280.01 0.00
1992 5,283.60 29,172.85 9,414.64 9,141.06 10,419.92 -20,031.78 -273.58 5,136.32
1993 5,021.95 22,840.21 11,742.15 11,524.01 11,589.21 -11,316.20 -218.14 6,567.26
1994 4,933.06 18,828.92 14,916.87 14,639.22 14,639.23 -4,189.69 -277.64 9,706.16
1995 5,268.97 11,404.91 18,786.03 18,624.62 18,886.70 7,219.71 -161.42 13,617.73
1996 5,256.77 8,446.97 16,425.49 16,498.50 16,498.50 8,051.53 73.01 11,241.73
1997 5,219.79 8,231.11 12,849.09 13,223.56 13,223.57 4,992.45 374.47 8,003.78
1998 5,155.46 10,184.68 9,831.25 10,367.09 10,368.52 182.41 535.84 5,213.06
1999 5,157.14 5,429.53 8,858.19 9,112.25 9,127.37 3,682.72 254.06 3,970.22
2000 5,864.61 9,214.74 7,984.24 8,189.68 8,494.76 -1,025.07 205.43 2,630.15
2001 5,831.36 3,620.13 7,063.19 7,673.58 7,729.83 4,053.45 610.39 1,898.46
2002 5,925.69 1,923.76 6,600.24 7,223.75 7,427.48 5,299.99 623.51 1,501.79
2003 5,818.97 4,383.36 5,395.85 6,012.84 6,714.04 1,629.48 617.00 895.07
2004 5,782.20 1,577.33 4,767.56 5,376.14 6,331.98 3,798.81 608.58 549.78
2005 6,001.29 -3,359.14 4,168.27 5,011.60 6,446.76 8,370.73 843.33 445.47
2006 6,062.71 -6,546.35 2,303.28 3,323.47 6,082.47 9,869.83 1,020.20 19.76
2007 6,113.83 6,050.27 -111.39 1,053.99 6,114.15 -4,996.28 1,165.38 0.32
2008 5,951.92 13,441.22 129.20 1,376.28 5,952.16 -12,064.94 1,247.07 0.24
2009 5,815.37 -1,388.15 1,594.28 2,877.89 5,817.18 4,266.04 1,283.61 1.80
*One billion yen
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Figure 5: Diewert's OOH Index and User Cost Indexes
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with the aim of quantitatively clarifying the extent of the discrepancies that arise due to
di®erences in estimation method.
We started with estimation based on the Equivalent Rent Approach employed in Japan.
In this study, for the Equivalent Rent estimation, we calculated a hedonic function using
market rent data and obtained the quality-adjusted market rent for each type of dwelling
unit.
Looking at the results obtained, at the bubble's peak in 1990, there was an 11-fold dis-
crepancy between the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing calculated in prefectural
accounting and the imputed rent estimated here. The divergence between the two then
became smaller over the years, shrinking to a 1.6-fold di®erence in 2009. With regard to the
causes of this discrepancy, we have assumed the following.
First, there is the gap in quality between owner-occupied housing and rental housing. In
the rent estimated in prefectural accounting, quality adjustment is not performed. But a
signi¯cant quality gap { such as di®erences in size { exists between owner-occupied and rental
housing. We believe that discrepancies are caused by this quality gap. However, it is not
possible to explain the 11-fold di®erence in scale during the bubble period with the quality
gap only. It is assumed that the most signi¯cant factor giving rise to the discrepancy between
the two sets of results was that during the bubble period and the subsequent collapse, when
the housing market °uctuated considerably, it was not possible to su±ciently link the \paid
rent" surveyed for the CPI to the market rent, so a signi¯cant discrepancy arose between
them. The size of this di®erence was estimated by Shimizu, Nishimura, and Watanabe
(2010). However, even though this kind of problem is present, it is not enough to explain
the 11-fold di®erence.
As well, the imputed rent estimated with SNA increased at least 8 times from 1990 to
2009. While the discrepancy between the two shrank over time, during this period rents
were on a downward trend and the increase in owner-occupied housing stocks was stable at
around 40%. This kind of change is impossible to explain, and one has to think that there
is a major problem with the estimation method.
Next, we estimated imputed rent based on the User Cost Approach. Even though market
rent was used in the Equivalent Rent estimation, it was easy to predict that it would be
di±cult to sensitively capture °uctuations during the period when housing prices changed
dramatically. While estimation with the User Cost Approach has been proposed in this
kind of situation, problems have been pointed out with the conventional Basic User Cost
Approach: the User Cost becomes negative when there are major increases in housing prices,
and it rises signi¯cantly during large-scale downward phases such as immediately after the
bubble's collapse. In other words, the volatility exceeds what is expected by market players.
Accordingly, we estimated the VV User Cost proposed by Ptacek and Verbrugge (2005)
and Diewert's User Cost and Diewert's OOH Index proposed by Diewert and Nakamura
(2009),(2011).
Looking at the estimate results, a signi¯cant gap arises between the Basic User Cost and
the VV User Cost and Diewert's User Cost at the start of the bubble collapse period in 1991.
30
The bubble collapsed in 1990, and as prices dropped through 1991, the rise in the Basic User
Cost was 6 times greater than that for Equivalent Rent. Meanwhile, with the VV User Cost
and Diewert's User Cost, which calculated capital gain using the anticipated growth rate for
housing prices by municipality over the previous 5 years, the User Cost became negative.
Even if the capital gain calculation is converted into the anticipated growth rate for the
previous 5 years in order to assimilate the dramatic single-year price change, the User Cost
becomes negative.
The reason for this is that the dramatic increase in housing prices during the bubble
period has a residual e®ect on the anticipated growth rate. What's more, the Basic User
Cost has a negative value during the market recovery period in the 2000s as well, and the
VV User Cost also becomes negative in 2007 during the so-called mini-bubble.
This shows that even when capital gain is calculated as the anticipated growth rate, the
User Cost becomes negative during large-scale price °uctuations such as the real estate
bubble that occurred in 1980s' Tokyo or amid signi¯cant changes in market prices such as
the \mini-bubble."
In order to resolve this kind of problem, employing the maximum value of Equivalent
Rent and User Cost for each dwelling measurement unit with Diewert's OOH Index has
been proposed. Looking at the di®erence between Diewert's OOH Index estimated in this
manner and Equivalent Rent reveals that a 3.5-fold discrepancy occurred in 1995 and that
there was on average an around 1.7-fold discrepancy from 1990 through 2009.
These ¯ndings show that even if Equivalent Rent approach is improved, quality adjust-
ment is performed, and market rent is used, signi¯cant discrepancies remain between the
estimation methods.
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